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Abstract: The survival circumstances for foreign SMEs in emerging economies during an economic crisis are extremely difficult. In this 
research we focus on examining underlying firm and corporate level characterisctics, which are not affected directly by strategic decisions, as a 
response to the crisis among foreign SMEs operating across 12 industries in Romania. Our empirical findings show that the type of industry, the 
country of origin, the industrial development and political systems of home and host countries have a significant relationship to the companies’ 
survival. These findings indicate the increasing intricacy of the relationships between various host economies, players of economic origins but 
also political institutions, as well as underline the global interconnectedness and home-host dynamics wave effects.  
INTRODUCTION 
The most recent economic crisis was considered the most 
severe and intense great recession since World War II. 
Many countries experienced economic decline; even though 
the ad-hoc mechanisms for preventing the collapse of the 
international payments systems were effective, the crisis left 
behind it a lot of concern about the future (Nabli, 2011). 
However, not all countries were affected by the crisis 
equally (Rose & Spiegel, 2009). In particular, emerging 
economies which could not rely on borrowed reserves via 
swap lines had to make rapid adjustments when the crisis 
developed (Aizenman et al., 2010). Emerging economies 
represent an interesting context for observing the 
performance of foreign firms for various reasons: they 
present multiple opportunities for growth attracting a wave 
of foreign firms; they have an uncertain institutional 
framework, on-going processes of refining regulatory 
framework, a low regulatory burden for foreign firms etc. 
Such economies thus present a mixture of attraction and 
rejection magnets for foreign firms, in some ways making 
life easy for these firms but in other ways posing just as 
many challenges as the advantages offered.  
 
Considering all this, international business scholars make 
the point that emerging economies represent the place and 
source for future theory testing, revelations and exploration 
(Uhlenbruck & De Castro, 2000; Oviatt, 1997). 
Additionally, the fast growing emerging markets offer a 
diversity of strategic goal opportunities for foreign firms. 
Regardless of their pedigree, all foreign firms are always on 
the lookout for various strategic objectives across the 
boundaries of emerging economies and, from what various 
studies and empirical phenomena have shown us, emergent 
economies are more than able to deliver (Uhlenbruck & De 
Castro, 2000).  
 
In the context of emerging economies in transition, 
economic downturn and crisis circumstances only enhance 
the difficulties faced by foreign firms in terms of surviving 
in such environments. Many companies have thus had to 
implement substantial changes compared to the way they 
used to operate, in order to survive. During economic 
recession is emerging economies the contextual uncertainty 
and bounded rationality enhance the external environment’s 
volatility or unpredictability. On the other hand, as stated by 
Booth (1993), failure, chaos and change are ubiquitous. 
Managers try to redefine failure, chaos and change, 
concentrating on changing failure to success, or else ignore 
these factors. Moreover, change per se is so rapid that the 
prediction of future shock is a reality (Booth, 1993). In such 
a context, many companies go bankrupt, due to their 
inflexibility and insufficient dealing with changes (in this 
case the crisis). 
 
As stated earlier, this crisis has not had the same impact on 
all countries. Rose and Spiegel (2009) obtained non-
significant results when trying to connect incidence and 
severity of the crisis and countries’ national characteristics, 
such as regulatory framework, financial conditions and 
macroeconomic, institutional and geographic features. As 
the number of foreign enterprises in countries all around the 
world is on the rise, with increasing interconnectedness at 
all levels, the recent economic crisis resulted in a decrease, 
or even turned many economic indicators negative, not only 
locally in particular countries, but as a chain reaction too 
(Internationalization Monitor, 2010).  
 
Given that all institutions, enterprises, or other entities are 
somehow connected to banks or financial institutions (where 
the crisis broke out) through financial products and have 
continuous transactions with each other, they also 
experienced problems, originating in the banking industry. 
A decline in many economic indicators of firms, 
governments and other entities followed these events. Also, 
problems with solvency occurred, due to a decline in the 
value of riskier assets, while consumer demand decreased as 
well (Poole, 2010). Thus, although of great importance, we 
will not consider any strategic actions, since these act as a 
reflection of firms’ management capabilities and their 
reaction to the crisis. Firm characteristics are, however, of 
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crucial importance, since they represent the pre-set or fixed 
conditions and organisational capabilities, which can further 
the understanding of survival or bankruptcy as a result of a 
crisis environment.  
 
Therefore, we assume that attributes resulting from the 
macro-level cannot always be influenced (in a shorter period 
of time) by managers; hence, firm’s characteristics and the 
level of its interaction with the market and nonmarket 
environment and its flexibility and ability to adapt, can all 
play an important role in dealing with and surviving a crisis 
(Baron 1995; Cook & Macaulay, 2010). Characteristics such 
as a firm’s financial condition, its age, size, type of industry, 
country of origin, represent indicators of the firm’s 
functioning which are relevant during a crisis too and which  
reflect the crisis’ consequences on the firm’s performance or 
survival. Thus, in this research we examine underlying firm 
and corporate level characteristics, which are not affected 
directly by strategic decisions as a response to the economic 
recession among foreign companies that survived the crisis, 
in the context of an emerging economy.  
 
The empirical analysis we have conducted focuses on the 
period before and after the crisis, in order to establish the 
critical characteristics of survival among foreign SMEs 
located in Romania. We focused on Romania because, as 
international business scholars have pointed out, emerging 
economies (such as Romania) represent the place and source 
for future theory testing, revelations and exploration 
(Gauselmann et al., 2011; Uhlenbruck&De Castro, 2000; 
Oviatt&McDougal, 1997). Additionally, fast growing 
emerging markets offer a diversity of strategic goal 
opportunities for FI (Baack & Boggs, 2008, Enderwick, 
2009). Romania is classified as an emerging economy 
(WEO, 2014). The growth of its GDP has recently increased 
rapidly, from 19,578 in 1992 to 122,696 (both in million US 
dollars) in 2006 (WEO, 2014). Therefore, this study has 
chosen to use data from foreign SMEs operating in 
Romania. The data for this study were gathered using a 
(postal and email) questionnaire survey, conducted among 
strategic decision makers (managing directors or owners) of 
SMEs, in the summer of 2013. 
 
In section two, the issues and theories that are relevant to 
this study are described, followed by a presentation of issues 
around methodology in section three. Section four is 
dedicated to the analysis and empirical results, as well as a 
presentation of the testing of our hypothesis. Section five 
interprets the results and reflects on their implications for 
theory, followed by our conclusions and future research 
ideas.  
FIRM LEVEL CHARACTERISTICS AND 
PERFORMANCE DURING ECONOMIC CRISIS 
In the current literature, much has been written about the 
most recent crisis and its negative consequences on 
economies (Radun, 2010; Bexley et al. 2010; Nabli, 2010; 
Rose & Spiegel, 2008, 2009; Sturgeon & Van Biesebroeck, 
2010). For example, Bexley et al. (2010) mention that 305 
banks went bankrupt in 2009, while during the period of the 
1980s-early 1990s, this number reached 1600. Therefore, it 
is not possible to blame the crisis as the only reason for all 
the company bankruptcies during this period. Witteloostuijn 
(2000) states that the decline of an organisation can be 
caused by internal factors, such as organisational inertia, 
escalating commitments, the threat-rigidity effect and 
external factors, such as strategic competition and 
turbulence. These factors are also mentioned in a model 
proposed by Cameron (1988).  Besides external factors, 
there are also firm-related determinants which can influence 
a firm’s performance, its survival or death during conditions 
of extreme economic downturn. In the following sections we 
discuss the relationship between companies’ financial 
indicators, their size (based on their employment base and 
fixed assets), their host country experience, the type of 
industry in which they operate and finally the country of 
origin of the SME and their survival during and after the 
most recent crisis (Grubber-Muecke & Hofer, 2015; Baack 
& Boggs, 2008). 
 
Financial Conditions of Firms: 
Several financial indicators can predict a company’s failure. 
Mensah(1984) argues that bankruptcyis gradual and thus can 
be predicted at least three years in advance. In a time of 
economic recession, the possibility that a company will fail 
is higher; such an outcome is not only caused by internal 
factors having to do with the company itself (Mensah, 
1984). External factors, such as inflation, interest rates and 
credit availability, as well as the business cycle can, 
according to Mensah (1984), influence the financial state of 
a firm, over time. Moreover, in order to examine each of 
these external factors, different financial indicators are more 
suitable.  
 
Mossman et al. (1998) have found that Altman’s (1968) 
model, based on financial ratios, was the most accurate one 
in predicting a firm’s failure one year prior to its 
bankruptcy. However, when it came to three years prior to 
the bankruptcy, the cash flow model, developed by Aziz et 
al. (1988) served as the best one for distinguishing between 
bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms. Mossman et al. (1988) 
also state that none of the four tested models are able to 
capture the data adequately and that they are not able to 
reliably predict a firm’s failure more than two years in 
advance (Mossman et al., 1988).  
Even though different field studies propose different 
financial ratios as the most important indicators, in general it 
can be assumed that these indicators are concerned with 
ratios measuring profitability, liquidity and solvency 
(Altman, 1968). Thus, in order to discuss the financial 
condition of firms, we will use Altman’s (1968) Z-score 
model and its components, which provide a clear and all-
encompassing overview, including: working capital/ total 
assets, retained earnings / total assets, earnings before 
interest and taxes/  total assets and net worth / book value of 
total debt.  
 
In the original model (Altman, 1968), the financial 
indicators are: working capital/ total assets; retained 
earnings / total assets; earnings before interest and taxes/ 
total assets; net worth/ book value of total debt and sales / 
total assets. However, this original model is only suitable for 
publicly held manufacturing companies, whereas in our 
research we focus on companies with different ownerships, 
originating in different industries. Therefore, instead of five 
financial indicators, the adjusted model uses only four, 
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without the indicator sales / total assets, controlling for the 
industries’ diversity (Altman et al., 2008). 
 
Working capital/ total assets: a firm which has constant 
operating losses will have declining current assets, in 
relation to total assets. If the firm struggles with continuing 
losses caused either by the seasonality of the market where 
it operates (i.e. decline in demand) or by poor management 
decisions regarding product/service management, marketing 
etc., the firm will lose its ability to fund its day-to-day 
operations. At the opposite pole, a company with a high 
working capital/total assets ratio will be more trustworthy, 
as seen by its suppliers, since the higher ratio indicates that 
it is able to pay its liabilities on time.  
 
Retained earnings / total assets: This indicator measures a 
firm’s cumulative profitability over time. Although the 
firm’s age is implicitly considered here, newer firms may 
show a lower ratio (because of less time to gain cumulative 
profits) and therefore higher probability of failure (Altman 
et al., 2008). When too much borrowed capital accumulates, 
companies can struggle or even become unable to pay it 
back to lenders. This issue can be even more critical when a 
company encounters a sudden relapse in market demand 
(e.g. resulting in lower sales). Though there are ways to 
overcome these problems (which is beyond the scope of this 
paper), such a situation can ultimately lead to a firm’s 
bankruptcy. 
 
Earnings before interest and taxes / total assets: This ratio 
represents productivity when it comes to the firm’s assets, 
eliminating tax or leverage factors and calculated by 
dividing a firm’s total assets into its earnings, before interest 
and tax reductions. Thus, the earning power of a firm’s 
assets is closely related with its solvency. If a firm cannot 
gain enough profit from utilising its assets, whether fixed or 
current, over time it will lose its efficiency and will in turn 
encounter problems, having to do with paying its suppliers, 
paying its employees, leading to a reduction or stop in 
investments in R&D, marketing, etc. This can be the case 
especially during a period of economic decline, when some 
industries suffer from low sales, such as the car industry 
(Sturgeon & van Biesebroeck, 2010). Those firms that 
cannot keep up with their competitors are more likely to go 
bankrupt. 
 
Net worth / book value of total debt: net worth/ book value 
of total debt shows the degree to which a firm's assets can 
decline in value, before liabilities exceed assets, leading to 
the firm becoming insolvent. Similarly to the previous ratios 
included in the Z-score model, this situation occurs when a 
company cannot utilise its assets efficiently enough, in order 
to keep the level of its assets higher than the level of its 
liabilities, which can be caused by an environmental shock 
(crisis) (Hannan & Freeman, 1984).  
After having argued individually about how all four 
components (Altman’s Z-score) of a firm’s financial 
condition can influence its survival or bankruptcy path, we 
are able to formulate the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the value of Altman’s Z- score 
model, the higher is the probability for the firm’s survival 
during economic crisis.  
Resources: 
Tangible resources: large firms have more resources that 
they can use to withstand shocks, while smaller firms, 
because of their smaller margins for error, cannot easily 
reduce their scope and therefore their rate of the bankruptcy 
tends to be higher (Hannan& Freeman, 1984). Numerous 
authors (e.g. Evans, 1986; Witteloostuijn, 2000; Hannan & 
Freeman, 1989; Gwemawat & Nabeluff, 1985) have stated 
that the size of a firm (referring to size as a tangible 
resource, measured by number of employees and fixed 
assets) is related to a firm’s chance of failure. Gwemawat & 
Nabeluff (1985) have made the point that, since there are 
cost asymmetries and different perceptions of costs between 
small and big firms, these operate differently, at different 
scales, when facing divergent levels of cost. If scale 
economies are not dominant, smaller firms deal with decline 
in demand better, since larger firms will be the first to deal 
with the costly overcapacity. Therefore, larger firms tend to 
be the first to exit the market (Witteloostuijn, 2000). 
Nevertheless, their exit does not necessarily lead to total 
bankruptcy. Firms can leave some of their business only 
partially operating (e. g. in terms of their downsizing 
capacity).  
 
Lee (2009) provides evidence that when it came to 
performance, the size of a firm matters: bigger companies 
were shown to outperform smaller ones. However,the results 
of this study and others like it often do not control for 
various factors which can play a role, such as firm strategies 
or entry barriers (Caves &Pugel, 1980; Lee, 2009).  
 
Evans (1986) as well as Hannan & Freeman (1989) have 
also provided evidence that bigger companies are less likely 
to fail. However, the relationship between size of firm and 
chance of failure is often moderated by a firm’s entry mode 
(Witteloostuijn, 2000).  
 
Although these studies did not take place within a economic 
recession situation, the results might have some validity for 
companies within a crisis situation. Hence, we can assume 
that the size of a firm plays an important role when 
determining its survival and formulate the following 
hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 2: The larger the tangible resources of a firm, 
the higher is the likelihood that it will survive during an 
economic crisis. 
 
Intangible resources / experience: authors like Dunne et al. 
(1988), Hannan & Freeman (1989), Evans (1986) and 
Witteloostuijn (2000) confirm, based on their empirical 
results, that the age of a company (as a measurement of its 
experience) is important in determining the company’s 
survival. Those companies which can adapt to a changing 
environment may be less likely to fail (Pangarkar, 2007). 
Companies which have already experienced critical 
situations in the past and have managed to survive them may 
be more successful in dealing with a crisis, compared to 
younger companies.  
 
This is supported by Altman’s (1968) study, in which he 
found, based on the financial indicators analysis, that the 
incidence of failure is higher in newer firms. In addition, 
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young, newly established foreign firms have different 
priorities than older firms; these differences in terms of 
priorities are pushed forward by their liability of newness. 
Moreover, these firms lack sufficient intangible resources, 
such as experience, knowledge accumulation, social capital 
and relationship networks in the host setting (Hillman et al., 
2004; Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Hillman &Hitt, 1999; 
Hillman, 2003).  
 
The liability of newness offers ground to argue that this lack 
of intangible resources, such as experience and unfamiliarity 
with the local environment, the lack of roots and reputation 
in a particular setting, can create prospects and incentives to 
deal with recession circumstances. Additionally, a credible 
reputation is intrinsic to social capital, the tacit resource 
attained through network building. Furthermore, the liability 
of foreignness suggests that newly established firms with 
very limited host experience are more liable and much more 
prone to risks in the context of a hostile crisis environment. 
Therefore, we are able to formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Firms with more host country experience are 
more likely to survive a economic crisis.   
 
Type of industry: 
The recent economic recession had a different impact on 
companies in different types of industries. The type of 
industry can also be a factor which distinguishes the firms 
which survived from those which went bankrupt. The pace 
of development and growth of an industry reflects the 
characteristics of firms and vice versa. Also, the demand for 
particular goods and services can either increase or decrease, 
in more extreme ways in some industries when compared to 
others, depending on the characteristics of particular goods 
and services. In particular, it has been argued that the 
banking and financial industry, the automotive industry, the 
construction industry and the housing industry were hit by 
the recent crisis the hardest (Sturgeon & van Biesebroeck, 
2010).  
 
However, some industries were protected by governments, 
due to the high degree of interconnectedness between these 
particular industries and the strategic importance for the 
overall national economic situation (Sturgeon & van 
Biesebroeck, 2010; Poole 2010). Thus, because of the 
different degree of interconnectedness between industries, 
different level of government interventions happened in 
different industries, and thus not all companies were equally 
affected by the crisis. Therefore, we can formulate the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The survival rate of companies during 
economic recession differs among different industries. 
CORPORATE LEVEL CHARACTERISTICS AND 
PERFORMANCE DURING A CRISIS 
Country of origin: 
As argued by Guillen & Garcia-Canal (2009), since 1990 
numerous SMEs from emerging, upper-middle-income, 
developing or oil-rich countries have emerged in the global 
competitive landscape. Since these countries differ in terms 
of political regimes and stage of economic development, 
multinational companies may have had to adapt to different 
environments. Thus, modern SMEs from these countries 
usually tend to possess better political capabilities and 
adaptability than traditional ones, since they are more used 
to dealing with unstable governments in their home 
countries (Guillen & Garcia-Canal, 2009). Therefore, we 
propose the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 5: The impact of economic recession on a 




In a more profound way, as in the previous section, the 
differences between countries also indicate psychic 
differences existing between the country of origin of the 
foreign firm and its host country, regarding political 
systems, level of industrial development, culture, language, 
all of which are examined by Dow & Karunaratna (2006) in 
their research. These differences represent a macro-level 
factor, which constitutes the environment within which 
firms’ managers operate (Dow &Karunaratna, 2006).  
 
The concept of psychic distance, as a relevant issue in 
international trade, was brought to closer scrutiny by 
researchers from the Uppsala School, who introduced the 
Internationalisation Theory (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; 
Hosseini, 2006). The underlying argument for inclusion of 
psychic distance in Internationalisation Theory involved an 
assumption that companies start the process of their 
internationalisation in countries that are less psychically 
distant (Melin, 1992). According to this theory, in countries 
that are psychically closer, it is easier for a firm to adapt to 
the environment, resulting in a higher probability of success 
in that market, when compared to countries with a 
psychically more distant environment (O’Grady & Lane, 
1996; Hosseini, 2006).  
 
However, O’ Grady & Lane (1996) also refer to another 
possible conclusion, according to which starting the 
internationalization process by entering a country close to 
home may result in poor performance and, possibly, failure. 
The possible reason for this can be that possible differences 
in psychically close countries (markets, environments) are 
underestimated; for this reason, this has been named the 
psychic distance paradox (Hosseini, 2006). In the present 
research, we focus on countries’ differences in terms of 
political systems and industrial development, something 
which has also been studied by Dow &Karunaratna (2006).  
Countries’ industrial development is connected to business 
norms and communication, amongst other things; therefore, 
Dow &Karunaratna (2006) assume that trade between 
countries with more similar levels of industrial development 
will be more intense. Following this idea, we assume that 
the possibility of foreign firms’ survival will also differ, on 
the basis of the differences in industrial development of each 
firm’s home country.  
The same argument can be applied to the political system in 
a firm’s home, in comparison to its host country. This is 
because the existing political system can have a great 
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influence in many areas, in communication norms when it 
comes to business-to-government relations, as well as 
business-to-business relations and business-to-customer 
interactions (Dow & Karunaratna, 2006). 
 
While being aware of the possible psychic distance paradox 
(Hosseini, 2006), in our research we hold the assumption 
that the closer the psychic distance between home and host 
country, the higher the probability that a company will 
succeed in this environment; this is also relevant in dealing 
better with the recent crisis and its consequences. According 
to these arguments, our next two hypotheses can be 
formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 6a: Foreign firms from home countries with an 
industrial level similar to the host country will be less prone 
to bankruptcy.  
Hypothesis 6b: Foreign firms from home countries with a 
similar political system to that of the host country will be 
less prone to bankruptcy. 
 
METHODOLOGY  
Sample and Data: 
In our study, the unit of analysis is represented by foreign 
subsidiaries located in Romania. These unit is considered at 
the subsidiary level, which means that even if the two 
companies are related through a common parent, they 
represent two separate entities. The total working sample 
consists of 4000 foreign companies from 36 home countries, 
including units which were active before the crisis and have 
remained active after the crisis too, as well as companies 
which were active before the crisis but have not remained 
economically active after it.  
 
Our study’s sample is highly representative in terms of the 
structure of the host economy;the active companies account 
together for almost 90,000 employees and approximately1-
billion-euro turnover. Also, according to official statistics, 
the FDI sectors represented together cca. 45% of Romania’s 
foreign trade. The data were provided by the Romanian 
Central Bureau of Statistics in the summer of 2012, in terms 
of the period prior to the recession.  
The database contains information and annual reports of the 
companies, for the period between 2007 and 2011. In order 
to analyse the data, we employed a variety of techniques as 
follws: To examine which companies, with particular 
characteristics, survived the crisis, we performed a cross-
sectional analysis. Furthermore, to find out the predictive 
relationship between companies’ characteristics and to 
compare the significance of each independent variable, a 





Survival status depicts the state of the foreign firm as 
economically active or non-active. Companies which 
survived are defined as companies that have remained 
economically active after the crisis, while non-active 
companies are those which went bankrupt during the crisis. 
In the analysis, active companies are coded as ‘1’ (meaning 
survival), whereas non-active ones are coded as ‘0’ 
(meaning bankruptcy).  
Independent variables: 
The variable ‘financial condition of the firm’ is measured 
through Altman’s Z-score model (1968).  
The calculation of the Z’-score proceeds as follows: 
Z’’ = 6.56(X1) + 3.26(X2) + 6.72(X3) + 1.05(X4) + (3,25) 
Where:  X1 = Working capital/ total assets 
              X2 = Retained earnings / total assets 
                X3 = Earnings before interest and taxes / total 
assets 
               X4 = Net worth/ book value of total debt 
               Z = Overall index. 
The constant (3,25) is included for comparability with the 
original Z-score (Altman et al., 2008). 
This score is calculated and examined for each company for 
the year 2007 (Z_2007), in order to see whether there were 
any indications of financial problems in the following year. 
According to Altman (1968), companies with a Z-score 
lower than (1, 81) are in a “distress zone” and thus are very 
prone to going bankrupt.  
 
In this research, those companies that had the lowest score 
(Z’’<1,81), both before the crisis and afterwards, and which 
went bankrupt in the following year, cannot be reliably 
considered as having gone bankrupt because of the crisis, 
since they were more prone to going bankrupt even if they 
had not been influenced by the crisis. Therefore, when 
interpreting our results, we have kept this in mind in order to 
avoid misinterpretation.  
 
Next the Z’’-score of each company (for non-active 
companies in the last year of their active state and for active 
companies in the last year during which data were available) 
(further mentioned as “last year”) (Z_last) is calculated, in 
order to examine its relationship with its survival. Also, the 
difference between Z” of the “last year” and Z’’(2007), 
(Z_diff) is calculated, in order to see whether companies 
with a declining/rising Z” score were more prone to 
bankruptcy/survival. We expect to see a decline tendency 
for a high percentage of the companies sampled, which 
would also justify the negative influence of the crisis on 
them.  
 
The variable ‘tangible resources’ is measured as the size of 
a company’s employment base (number of employees) and 
the size of the company’s fixed assets.  
 
The variable ‘intangible resources’ is measured as the 
experience of a foreign firm in the host country, based on 
the years from when the company was established in the 
host country (Romania) until the final year of its activity 
(thus, the overall number of years which the company 
operated in Romania).    
 
The variable ‘type of industry’ is a categorical variable, as 
follows: (1) agriculture and food; (2) automotive; (3) 
construction; (4) mining; (5) computers and electronics 
manufacturers; (6) transport and communication; (7) 
finance, banking, and insurance; (8) health care; (9) housing 
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and real estate (industry representativeness is presented in 
Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. Industry representativeness of sample foreign SMEs in Romania 
 
The variable ‘country of origin’ is a dummy variable of the 
home country of the foreign firms.  
 
The variable ‘psychic distance’ captures the difference 
between political systems, in terms of the political ideology 
that exists in the home country of the foreign firm and the 
host country; it also captures the difference in terms of 
industrial development between home and host countries. 
The data for this variable are based on Dow & 
Karunaratna’s (2006) instrument, aiming to measure psychic 
distance stimuli, derived from Beck’s (Beck et al., 2001) 
political ideology scale, which according to Dow & 
Karunaratna (2006), represent a good indicator for the more 
general psychic distance measure. These indicators are 
measured on a metric scale.  
RESULTS  
Table 1 presents the overview of the preliminary assumptions and the required ratios which are met.  
Table 1. Preliminary assumptions 
 N Skewness Kurtosis 
 Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Survival status 4000 -.520 -1.747 
Tangible resources before crisis 4000 6.320 49.495 
Tangible resources final year/at bankruptcy  4000 6.223 51.274 
Tangible resources average/during crisis 4000 6.305 51.121 
Intangible resources 4000 2.340 7.490 
Political distance 4000 4.546 22.869 
Industrial development 4000 2.155 5.619 
Country of origin 4000 4.386 19.346 
Z_2007 4000 11.159 143.955 
Z_final year of life 4000 -7.087 87.716 
Z_diff 4000 -8.400 83.934 
Tangible resources_assets size 4000 6.934 53.402 
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From the total numberof observations,62.5 % of the foreign 
companies remain active while 37.5 % companies went 
bankrupt.  
When comparing the -2* log-likelihood of the model, which 
represents the overall fit of the model, where none of the 
independent variables are included in the model (264.631) 
and the model where these are included, it can be seen that 
the latter has a significantly lower value at 0.05 level 
(164.808). Thus, our model correctly predicts 81.5 % of all 
cases.  
The results of hypotheses testing are presented in table 2. 
Table 2. Overall results 
Variables B Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Type_indust  18.887 .026  
 (1) Agriculture and food  -.035 .002 .968 .966 
 (2) Automotive 19.951 .000 .998 4.621E8 
 (3) Construction  1.430 1.777 .182 4.177 
 (4) Mining  -.952 1.510 .219 .386 
 (5) Computers & electronics manufacturers -1.321 2.591 .107 .267 
 (6) Transport and communication -.702 .806 .369 .496 
 (7) Finance, banking, and insurance .399 .193 .661 1.491 
 (8) Health care -1.435 3.536 .060 .238 
 (9) Housing and real estate -2.217 6.616 .010 .109 
Tangible resources before crisis -.112 .058 .809 .894 
Tangible resources final year/at bankruptcy  -.108 .054 .816 .897 
Tangible resources average/during crisis .222 .057 .811 1.248 
Intangible resources .020 2.802 .094 1.020 
Political distance -4.249 6.569 .010 .014 
Industrial development -2.224 4.365 .037 .108 
Country of origin 9.392 8.036 .005 11997.616 
Z_2007 .125 2.248 .134 1.133 
Z_final year of life .116 3.103 .078 1.123 
Tangible resources_assets size .000 1.041 .308 1.000 
Constant -.580 .532 .466 .560 
 
First, we examined the relationship between the Z”-score 
(Z_2007) at the time when the companies were not affected 
by the crisis, in terms of the companies’ survival. In order to 
examine the strength of its relationship with the dependent 
variable, the Wald statistic was used, which provides the 
measure of statistical significance for each estimated 
coefficient in the model (Hait et al., 2010). The Wald 
statistics for Z_2007 has a value of 2.248 at 0.134 level of 
significance. This, however, represents a non-significant 
impact on the estimation probability. In order to examine the 
direction of the relationship, either an original logistic 
coefficient (see B column in Table 2) or an exponentiated 
logistic coefficient (see Exp(B) in Table 2) can be used 
(Hair et al., 2010). Both of these have different values 
because the exponentiated logistic coefficient is the 
logarithm of the original coefficient and therefore cannot 
have a negative value. Variable Z_2007 shows a positive 
relationship (Exp(B)= 1.133), which means that with 
increasing the Z”-score, the probability of the companies’ 
survival increases. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is partially 
supported.  
 
The tangible resource base of the company has a non-
significant predictive accuracy in terms of the company’s 
survival. The tangible resources before the crisis show a 
negative relationship with the survival (Exp(B)= 0.894): it 
could be assumed that companies with a bigger employment 
base are more prone to bankruptcy during a crisis. However, 
the value of B- coefficient -0.112 is close to zero, thus, the 
result can be misleading. Moreover, the Wald statistics 
(0.058) for variable tangible resources before the crisis are 
non-significant, at 0.05 level of significance (0.809).  
 
The same results also applyto the tangible resources at the 
final year, thus the resources during the final year of 
existence for the companies which did not survive. 
Furthermore, the variable tangible resources during the 
crisis shows a positive relationship with the company status 
as being active / having survived; as in the previous cases, 
the result of the Wald statistics (0.057) is non-significant 
(0.811), at a 0.05 level of significance. When taking into 
account the companies’ size, based on the size of their fixed 
assets, there is a non-significant and weak relationship 
(Sig.= 0.308; Wald= 1.041) between this variable and the 
dependent variable. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is not 
supported. 
 
When testing for the Hypotehsis 3 regarding the impact of 
the intangible resources (host country experience) on a 
company’s status (survival or bankruptcy) we observed a 
positive relationship, and because of this we accept 
Hypothesis 3.   
 
The combined effect of differences between home and host 
country of origin is positive (B = 9,392). Also, the Wald 
statistics (8,036) is significant (Sig. = 0.005), at a 0.05 level 
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of significant. Based on these results, it can be said that with 
an increasing country difference, the probability of 
companies’ survival during a crisis increases.  
 
The difference between the host and home country’s level of 
industrial development shows a negative relationship with 
the dependent variable (B = -2.224). As in the previous case, 
this is significant (Sig. = 0.037), with the value of the Wald 
statistics being 4.365. Thus, Hypothesis 6a is supported.  
 
The variable political distance has a negative relationship 
with the dependent variable (B = -4.249). The impact of this 
variable is significant (Sig. = 0.010), at 0.05 level of 
significance, with a value of the Wald statistics at 6.569. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 6b is supported.  
 
The variable type of industry exhibits a significant impact 
on companies’ survival (Sig. = 0.026), with the value of 
Wald statistics at 18.887, which is the highest value among 
all the independent variables. This means that the chance of 
a company’s survival is significantly different depending on 
the type of industry. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 is supported.  
 
The transport and communication industry exhibits the 
strongest negative relationship with the survival status, 
meaning that in our context and sample, the transport and 
communication industry were the ones who were affected 
the most by the crisis. This implies that the largest number 
of companies which did not survive the crisis originated in 
this industry. Furthermore, the strongest positive 
relationship with the dependent variable can be seen within 
the industry of computers and electronics manufacturers. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The main goal of this paper has been to examine the 
relationship between specific characteristics of companies in 
terms of their survival after the emergenceof the great 
economic depression. We have focused on foreign 
companies located in Romania, which, according to 
UNCTAD (2009), was one of the countries most affected by 
the recent economic and financial downturn.  
 
Our results show that both firm level and corporate level 
characteristics have a significant relationship to the survival 
of foreign companies in an emerging economy. Namely, 
firm’s financial condition, its intangible resources, the type 
of industry, the country of origin, the differences in terms of 
industrial development and political systems between home 
and host countries, have all been proven to influence the 
survival status of the companies that were analysed.  
 
The influence of the type of industry on companies’ survival 
proved to be significant, as expected. Some industries, such 
as the food industry, the healthcare industry and the energy 
and sustainability related sectors, were less negatively 
affected by the crisis, whereas other industry types, such as 
the housing, financial and banking industries, as well as the 
automotive industry, were affected more negatively.  
 
Hence, we focused on some companies from these industries 
in our research and we then extended our focus to other 
important industries, namely construction, mining, 
computers and electronics, as well as transportation and 
communication, in order to gain better reliability in our 
analysis. Nevertheless, as was mentioned before, some of 
the core or most important industries, such as the banking 
industry and the automotive industry were in some cases 
artificially protected by governments during the recession 
(Sturgeon & van Biesebroeck, 2010; Poole 2010) in 
different countries. Ttherefore, any conclusions about 
whether these industries possess specific characteristics, 
such as companies’ flexibility to adapt more adequately to 
new situations, cannot be specified by this research.  
 
A more in-depth analysis of the influence of governmental 
and other players’ actions on companies’ functioning should 
be conducted, in order to reach a better understanding about 
the crisis’ positive or negative consequences. The reason for 
this may be, as mentioned above, that some industries in 
general, or some individual companies, received support 
which protected them from bankruptcy. Some authors, such 
as Baron (1995) and Hillman & Hitt (1999) have taken the 
approach of examining firms’ non-market strategies, 
concluding that companies (industries) using these strategies 
can then profit from them. This can in turn influence their 
performance but can also provide an advantage to other 
firms, even in free market economies. 
Previous issues, regarding different interventions, could also 
apply to the size of the companies represented, in terms of 
the size of their employment base and fixed assets. This is 
because larger companies with more tangible assets and a 
larger employment base are often under media pressure; 
also, governments tend to keep them in mind more, as they 
are important employers compared to smaller companies 
(Getz, 1997; Meznar & Nigh, 1995). They also have a better 
chance to influence political actions, while smaller 
companies more often turn to collective action (Hillman & 
Hitt, 1999). This should in turn benefit bigger companies 
rather than smaller ones.  
This, however, was not significantly confirmed by our 
analysis. We assume that one reason for this could be that in 
a time of crisis, smaller firms are able to implement quick 
actions to overcome the crisis, whereas the implementation 
of such actions can be harder to do for bigger companies, 
because of their larger number of employees. Moreover, we 
also assume that it could be more difficult for larger 
companies to deal with the overcapacity during a crisis as 
well as to sell some of their excessive assets, since 
investment activity of the market and of other players 
declines in such periods. 
 
Caves and Porter (1977) as well as Porter (1979) state that 
the differences between the performance of small and big 
firms vary across industries (also, see Lee, 2009). In 
addition, variations in market share and market 
concentration are important factors when looking at firms’ 
performance, caused by the firms’ absolute size. Market 
power can then be reflected by variables such as capital 
intensity, R&D expenses, or the intensity of advertising 
(Lee, 2009). Market concentration can also be a predictor of 
market power, since firms in concentrated industries can 
exploit the advantages of collusions, by increasing their 
profit margins. However, here too, this relationship is 
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Regarding firms’ intangible resources, as mentioned before, 
during longer periods of time, firms may develop their 
reputation and knowledge and learn to implement strategic 
actions in more efficient and flexible ways (Hsu & Hannan, 
2005; Suchman, 1995). The argument which also supported 
this hypothesis was that, in order to gain the previously 
mentioned knowledge and capabilities, younger firms tend 
to focus more on market-related issues, whereas older 
companies tend to prioritise institutional issues (Hillman & 
Hitt, 1999) and are also usually more experienced in dealing 
with crises. One possible reason could be that the crisis 
emerged relatively fast, first hitting hard the financial 
industry, to which both young and old companies are 
connected through their investments, contracts and other 
financial assets; this meant that their chances of 
manoeuvring or swiftly adapting to the new situation were 
limited. Also, especially in the booming industry sectors, 
such as computers and electronics manufacturers or other 
new industries, many younger companies were facing a fast 
changing environment or had to deal with high seasonality, 
giving them the ability to adapt to the crisis more quickly. 
Moreover, because of the high and ever-increasing 
interconnectivity of some industries, due to globalisation, 
both young and older companies could have been in, or were 
somehow connected to, industries with a high level of 
governmental or other interventions. Therefore, the 
difference in survival of younger and older companies after 
the outbreak of the crisis is not so straight forward.  
 
The difference between political systems, when comparing 
home and host countries, was one of the elements referring 
to the country difference measure in this research. This 
proved to have a significant negative influence on 
companies’ survival, as expected. The same results emerged 
also for the second separate element of the country 
difference, the industrial development.  
As stated by Guillen& Garcia-Canal (2009), modern SMEs 
from non-traditional countries of origin may actually 
possess a better capability and adaptability than companies 
from traditional countries. This is because they are more 
used to dealing with unstable governments, in their home 
countries, and can therefore better deal with difficult 
circumstances, such as a crisis, and their consequences.  
 
When considering Romania as a democratic and industrially 
emerging country, this result does not necessarily mean that 
companies from non-democratic or “non-developed 
countries” are always more successful in surviving the 
crisis. When it comes to democracy and industrial 
development, Romania is not considered a country with the 
best political system and industrial development. The range 
of political systems of foreign SMEs ranges from 
Constitutional Monarchy in Liechtenstein to parliamentary 
democracy (e.g. Germany) and there are also countries with 
combined political systems, such us the United Kingdom, 
with unitary parliamentary democracy as well as 
constitutional monarchy. None of the companies included in 
the sample, however, originates from current communist 
countries. Therefore, a wide range of different political 
systems and levels of industrial developments between 
countries is not included in our sample. To overcome this 
problem, future research could lead to different results when 
it comes to these two variables. However, in our opinion, 
because of the increasing globalisation, the difference in 
industrial development between countries will gradually 
decrease and the same will also apply to political systems.  
 
On the other hand, Romania is an economy in transition, 
with low corporate tax rates, which can be of high 
importance in a time of crisis. Firms in Romania can benefit 
from high investments in R&D which, since 2002 (and until 
2008), increased by 16%, while the share of companies with 
R&D decreased by 1%. Moreover, Romania is a member of 
EU and is well located geographically. However, it seems 
that it will take longer for EU-countries to recover. Also, 
even if the crisis had not hit all countries at the same time, 
this would not necessarily have meant that the countries hit 
first would have been the first to recover 
(Internationalisation Monitor, 2010). 
 
Future research about the impact of the crisis on companies’ 
survival will be a big challenge and will require a wide 
approach in order to better understand the relevant issues. 
Also, a comparison could be made between different 
countries, ranging from those which were hit by the crisis 
the most, to those countries which were hit by the crisis the 
least. This will allow researchers to understand the different 
patterns according to which firms react to shocks in their 
market or during a global crisis, as this paper has discussed.  
 
Another venue which we have not been able to explore in 
our research is the possible and very probable connection 
between the characteristics mentioned above and the issue 
of management capabilities. For example, the companies’ 
management, in the context of working in a dynamic 
environment, in which there is a need to constantly enforce 
innovations, could be more flexible, or could be better 
prepared for unexpected situations than companies in a 
static environment. Harrigan (1980) states that there are 
some industries and particular firm characteristics where 
strategic changes can be implemented more easily 
(Witteloostuijn, 2000). This also depends on the experience 
of the management team.  
 
Our empirical findings are relevant to multiple-home / 
single-host FDI. We also suggest future investigation into 
other types of research contexts, in order to generalise our 
findings, that is, we suggest that a multiple-home/ multiple-
host investigation could be conducted, to cover other nation-
level factors that are not covered in our study (cultural 
distance, political environments; see Gomes-Casseres, 1990; 
Kogut&Singh, 1988). Studies have shown that investors 
consider industrialised economies and emerging economies 
as two distinct groups and confirm relevant differences in 
foreign entry modes for the two types of economies (Disdier 
& Mayer, 2004). Our findings set incentives for future 
comparison with industrialised economies and point to the 
need to provide clear arguments about whether such groups 
of economies should be regarded as different.  
 
This study contributes to the field in various ways. Firstly, 
the host country that we have focused on is new for the 
entry mode literature. Even though abundant, previous 
studies have looked at industrialised economies and to the 
best of our knowledge, none of the earlier studies has taken 
a deeper look at economies in transition as well as at 
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characteristics of foreign firms that contribute to their 
survival during difficult economic circumstances, such as 
crisis and recession.  
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